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AESTHETICS AS A ZONING CONSIDERATION
By MELVIN ROSE* and GEORGE YIM*
ZONING, with regard to aesthetic considerations has long been a
source of conflict in courts. Most courts have denied the exercise of the
police power for aesthetic purposes alone, basing their avoidance on
claims that such exercise is unconstitutional under the "due process of
law" clause. However, courts are developing a sensitivity to aesthetic
considerations even though the application of this sensitivity to zoning
problems has been generally disguised under the familiar phrase public
health, safety, welfare and morals.
There seems to be a definite trend toward recognizing ordinances
purely for aesthetic considerations. Such an application of the police
power for aesthetic purposes need not be unconstitutional. The term
aesthetics has been applied by the courts with three distinctions: (1)
when a definite social benefit is involved; (2) aesthetics based on in-
dividual taste; and (3) when it is obvious that aesthetics is the primary
purpose of the zoning law, but the courts have without mention of
aesthetics in their decision, sustained the exercise on some other
ground.
A few courts have attempted to define "aesthetic" as "relating to
that which is beautiful and in good taste,"' and as relating "to char-
acter, form and appearance of proposed constructions." 2 Webster de-
fines it as "of or pertaining to the beautiful, as distinguished from the
merely pleasing, the moral, and especially the useful."3
The courts' definition of these values is as varied as their applica-
tion in relation to the police power. All-inclusive definitions are neither
satisfactory nor successful;4 they merely afford further license for the
broadening of the scope. Recourse has been had to the gradual process
of inclusion and exclusion in order to ascertain the nature of the
power. 5 Since there are very few specific constitutional limitations
upon the use of police power other than it must bear reasonable rela-
tion to the promotion of public welfare the general limitations are the
result of court decisions.6
Members, Second Year class.
'People v. Wolf, 216 N.Y. Supp. 741, 744, 127 Misc. 328, Nassau County Ct.
(1926).
2 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149,
193 N.E. 799, 815 (1935).
3 WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 42 (2d ed. 1954).
4 See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
5 E.g., Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1907).
6 Baker, Aesthetic Zoning Regulations, 25 MICH. L. REv. 124 (1926).
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Aesthetics-Legislation and Judicial Interpretation
The failure of the courts to liberalize their policy toward aesthetic
zoning appears to be largely caused by the indefiniteness of the stand-
ard of what is reasonable aesthetic regulation. Courts are wary of an
application which would leave too much scope for the personal judg-
ment of the particular court. Much of the difficulty lies in the failure
of the courts to distinguish the following three categories of legislation
to which the label "aesthetic" has been applied:
1. Legislation wherein rights are affected and which produces a
proven, tangible benefit to society; where aesthetics is considered but
is only an underlying factor to the qualifying purposes of public health,
morals or safety;
2. Where the offensiveness of the condition legislated against is
dependent upon the artistic taste of the individual (where the aes-
thetic consideration is paramount) and;
3. Where no justification can be found through reasons of health,
morals or safety and yet the courts choose to ignore aesthetic consid-
erations in relying on tenuous reasoning of justification under the po-
lice power.
Those ordinances have been upheld where through the exercise of
the police power there has been a tangible social benefit. Although
aesthetic considerations may be within the general purposes, it was
not in itself the primary motivation for the legislation or ordinance in
this category. Included in this area are the powers of eminent domain,
public housing, planning commissions and zoning ordinances. Slum
clearance and public housing projects for low income families are
public uses and purposes for which public money may be expended
under the powers of eminent domain.7
City planning has sufficiently proven its merits to be supported by
the courts, by implementation through the power of zoning. The value
of the zoning device has been so thoroughly demonstrated that the
constitutionality of the principle of zoning laws and ordinances is no
longer open to question, so long as they are reasonable in object and
not arbitrary in operation.8
Although aesthetics should be a valid consideration under the exer-
cise of police power, there are very practical reasons for the limitation
of legislative or committee powers where the determination of offen-
siveness is dependent on the particular individual taste of those of
keener sensibilities. Ordinances based on aesthetic considerations alone
have not been upheld.
A standard of beauty to be applied by the individual court to
determine whether the ordinance promulgated under the police power
7 CAL. CODE C,." Pnoc. § 1238, subd. 3, 18 & 21; San Benito County v. Copper
Mountain Mining Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 82, 45 P.2d 428 (1935).
8 Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925).
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was reasonable or not would be inoperable as a rule of law. It is very
difficult to outline a reasonable standard for a cognition through the
senses rather than through analytic thought.0
It may be suggested that a jury of art experts or architects, quali-
fied through experience or educational training, be utilized, with au-
thority to approve or disapprove building design and land use at their
discretion. On this alternative, the potential fault would be that the
opinion of the jury as to beauty might not represent the average per-
son's viewpoint, which, in a final sense, is the essential principle in
justifying aesthetics as a valid consideration under the police power.
The jury's decision might deny society the architectural philosophies
and skill of building geniuses who are before their time; those whose
works may be initially condemned, but who transcend and remold
whole concepts of design.10
Courts which have denied any form of aesthetic regulation have
undoubtedly considered all such legislative measures within this cate-
gory of the ultra-aesthetics and have reacted to avoid being enmeshed
in these difficulties.
9 The cases have not been consistent as to the standard to be applied. For a case
where the clear showing of a breach of exercise of police power has not been met see
Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 Pac. 388 (1925) (where there was
a fluctuation in property values beneficial to some and detrimental to others on the oppo-
site sides of the street). See also, Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202
P.2d 38 (1949); Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d 542
(1946); Rehfield v. San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 21 P.2d 419 (1933) (where no injury
to public will be caused by the prohibited use); Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal.
304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930) (where hospital and sanitarium excluded on the basis that the
restricted districts are mainly residential in character).
Some courts have failed to distinguish between the exercise of police power and the
law in regard to nuisances, and have held regulations unreasonable and invalid where an
attempt is made to exclude from a district an established use of business which is not a
nuisance. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930); Ex parte
Hadacheck, 165 Cal. 416, 132 Pac. 584 (1913); Laurel Hill Cemetery Ass'n v. San Fran-
cisco, 152 Cal. 464, 93 Pac. 70, (1907), aff'd, 216 U.S. 358 (1910).
Regulations were deemed unreasonable and invalid in Bernstein v. Smutz, 83 Cal.
App. 2d 108, 188 P.2d 48 (1947) (restrictions create a monopoly). See also Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (valid ordinance administered in an unfair and dis-
criminatory manner); In re White, 195 Cal. 516, 234 Pac. 396 (1925); Bank of America
v. Atherton, 60 Cal. App. 268, 140 P.2d 678 (1943) (entirely unsuitable for the uses
to which it is restricted by ordinance); Andrews v. City of Piedmont, 100 Cal. App. 700,
281 Pac. 78 (1929); Wickham v. Becker, 96 Cal. App. 443, 274 Pac. 397 (1929).
10 In November of 1961 a proposal for a "desigu control ordinance" was submitted
to the San Francisco City Planning Commission. The proposal is in essence like those
found in other California cities (Sacramento, Monterey, Gilroy, and Kern County). Or-
dinances of similar import are enacted in New Orleans and Washington, D.C. These
consist of a special committee made up of trained personnel who will determine whether
any design submitted to them is up to required standards. The ordinance will be invoked
(if passed) only in those areas of the city where 51% of the occupants have elected
to accept it. Its basic purpose is to preserve areas of beauty by 1) preventing new build-
ings out of pattern, and 2) prevent too much pattern.
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The court's failure to sanction the use of police power is appropri-
ately applied in this area where the only measurement is the individ-
ual taste.
The third area, within which the true controversy lies, is brought
to point by those particular cases which fall into neither one of the
preceding categories. These cases are exemplified by instances where
the structure or use of the land is not itself offensive to health, morals,
or general welfare, but where the courts have deemed the ordinances
prohibiting or restricting such structure or use of land as valid within
the broad definition of the police power without regard for the defi-
nition. Originally the use of the police power was considered justifiable
in restricting the use of property only to protect the public peace,
health, safety, and morals of the community. This concept has been
expanded to include the power to promote general welfare, public con-
venience or general prosperity.1
The early attitude appears to have been that control of billboard
advertising was a purely aesthetic regulation and as such was con-
demned as unconstitutional.'12 Even with strong public support, courts
still resorted to searching for fictitious reasons supporting health,
morals, and public welfare.
One of the first cases to evidence expansion of the doctrine was
St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis,'3 a suit to prevent the
defendant from enforcing a city ordinance prohibiting the erection
and display of advertising billboards on vacant lots within the city of
St. Louis. The court, in sustaining the ordinance, mentioned the aes-
thetic considerations only in passing while developing a highly unlikely
and poorly disguised theory of the promotion of health, safety, and
morals of the community. "Signboards," the court held, ".... endanger
the public health, promote immorality, constitute hiding places and
retreats for criminals and all classes of miscreants." 4 Then in one short
sentence Justice Woodson hurried over the aesthetic essence of the
ordinance and said, "they are also inartistic and unsightly."' 5 The rest
of the decision goes on adding more camouflage.
Though the true reason for the decision was somewhat obscured,
this was one of the first courts to show any flexibility in the rule against
zoning for aesthetic reasons. The court dared venture into a contro-
versial subject matter but few courts were willing to follow the lead,
much less expand on it.
Some few courts attempted to clear the way and found they had
stepped further than was thought reasonable by the higher courts in
11 Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925).
12 Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944).
"3235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911).
14Id. at 145, 137 S.W. at 942.
IS Ibid.
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the jurisdiction.16 The third area is, then, primarily made up of cases
highly inconsistent in their logic but extremely uniform in their studied
avoidance of the true issue. It seems highly unrealistic to seek goals
of public welfare by ignoring aesthetics, or skirting around the prob-
lem so that the doctrine develops haphazardly.
Trend Toward Aesthetic Zoning
The trend of the law toward aesthetic zoning has developed over
the last half century and has been mainly centered in this third area.
In 1915, it was stated that:17
[.. T]his [police] power might be used to promote beauty in fields
that could be entered by eminent domain or taxation we find it held
that restriction upon the use of property for purely aesthetic pur-
poses, as limiting the heights of buildings, or forbidding unsightly
billboards ...have so far been generally denied validity in this
country. (Emphasis added.)
This was the position of the law at a period just beginning to see
the growth of slums, their attendant economic and social repercussions,
and the surrounding vast urban communities with their complexities.
The pressures of these new social interests have caused the courts to
revise their former method of dealing with individual interests.
The basic rights inherent in land ownership have never been im-
mutable. "They can, have been, and must be continuously reshaped
to meet changing needs."1s
The interdependence of urban living and the effects of the utiliza-
tion of property upon the adjoining land has made a "laissez faire"
attitude toward land-use impossible, but the courts have treaded
lightly when limiting the common law rights of a person who owned
land.
The constitutionality of legislating for aesthetic purposes appeared
too ephemeral to the early courts for the denial of those rights. It was
held that aesthetic considerations were a matter of luxury and indul-
gence rather than necessity, "and it is necessity alone which justifies
the exercise of the police power to take private property without com-
1'5 Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944). The superior
court of Connecticut was refreshingly candid in surveying the history of billboard regu-
lation claiming that prior decisions were falling short in their duty and that the courts
should now recognize the fact that aesthetics is the principal reason for most billboard
ordinances and aesthetics is the reason that should be given. The court termed reasons
such as those given in St. Louis Gunning as complete nonsense. The appellate court
reversed the decision giving the same reasons, with few changes, that the court gave in
St. Louis Gunning and claimed the superior court obviously lacked facts necessary to
make the decision.
17 HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 143 (1915); see also BuRncic, THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 567 (1922).
18 HAAR, LAND PLANNING IN FREE SOCIETY 2 (1952).
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pensation." 19 However, the fourteenth amendment did not spell out
any absolute legal rights, and "due process" is a weighing or balancing
of the various conflicting interests a constantly changing concept. 20
Part of the reason behind the increasing cognizance by the courts
of the aesthetic values desirably incorporated into regulatory ordi-
nances lies within the courts themselves.
The courts are increasingly rejecting the old "subjective view" for
determining the validity of legislation. This old view required the
court to decide the question solely on its own cenception of reasonable-
ness. It took into account none of the factors giving rise to the leg-
islation and affected by it, nor of the public opinion supporting or
initiating the legislation. The standard set by the court was a purely
personal one and it ignored the opinion, experience, and research of
those supporting the legislation.21
Today the courts are adopting a more exacting theory which may
be termed the objective view. This holds that the surrounding circum-
stances should be taken into consideration and weight placed on in-
dividual circumstances according to realistic values. Those holding the
objective view are free to give much weight to legislative action when
considering the constitutionality of an ordinance. No longer need the
court rely on its own sense of value or judgment. Rather the rationale
of the legislation itself is the final criterion.
This view allows the use of scientific information and investigation
which the legislative body itself used in formulating the ordinance.
The issue then becomes not a question of evidence presented by the
parties, but rather whether the general economic, social, and political
experience furnishes a solid basis for the legislation under attack.
The other main reason behind the upholding of ordinances, where
aesthetics are the major consideration is the more expansive adminis-
trative recourse which the property owner must exhaust before the
question gets to the court.
California has been one of the leaders in advancing the trend
toward recognizing aesthetic factors in zoning. It is one of the states
along with New York and Massachusetts who are closest to the adop-
tion of the objective view.
In 1940, a New York tire firm sought to place a sign over a street
and brought action to enjoin the village of Hempstead from enforcing
an ordinance prohibiting "any" kind of signs to project or hang from
the front of buildings. The court denied the injunction and its opinion
stated: "This court is not restricted to aesthetic reasons in deciding to
19 Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285,
287, 62 AtI. 267, 268 (Ct. of Errors & Appeals 1905).
2 0 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Haiv. L. REv. 1, 4 (1943).
21 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
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sustain validity of the ordinance in question, but if it were so restricted
it would not hesitate to sustain the legislation on that ground alone.."22
A Massachusetts court has held that the legislature has a constitu-
tional right to enact statutes that protect the grandeur and beauty of
scenery since it contributes highly to the public welfare of the state.23
California, though lacking cases which recognize aesthetics in a
straightforward manner, has instituted an act which provides unusual
opportunities for California to advance the trend upholding these ordi-
nances, and perhaps even those based on aesthetics alone.
The act providing such opportunity is referred to as the Outdoor
Advertising Act.2 4 On first glance the act seems hardly different from
acts in other states intending the same control over advertising on and
along highways. It appears to be the state acting within its proper
police power in controlling the advertising on public highways in un-
incorporated areas from the standpoint of safety; that is, to provide
state regulation and restriction so that the safety of those traveling the
highway is not impaired.
However, the act authorizes counties to regulate advertising dis-
plays as part of county zoning even when only indirectly involving
freeways. Thus it seems clear that in unincorporated areas a county
may in the course of district planning, as commonly practiced, control
advertising. For example, if an ordinance specified an area to be zoned
for residential purposes and a freeway passes through the zone, then
as a part of comprehensive planning, it would be proper to provide
that no billboards etc. could be placed in such areas including the
land adjacent to, but not touching, the freeway.25
Why then does this give California the opportunity to advance?
Courts elsewhere have already gone so far as to indicate that the pres-
ervation of scenic beauty and places of historic interest would be suffi-
cient to support zoning regulations.26
The act seems to be a clear intention on the part of the legislature
to place within the state itself exclusive domination and control of ad-
vertising on the public highways in unincorporated areas. This is il-
lustrated by the fact that not only may land adjoining freeways be
restricted, but also land adjacent to it. Therefore it seems to rule out
the safety aspect in many cases and be purely for aesthetics.
The Attorney General has concluded that all indications, under the
present state of the law, are that courts will eventually uphold ordi-
22 Preferred Tires v. Village of Hempstead, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377, 173 Misc. 1017,
1021 (Nassau County Ct. 1940).
23 General Outdoor Adv'g Co. v. Board of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E.
799 (1935).
24 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5200.
25 People v. Norton, 108 Cal. App. Supp. 767, 288 Pac. 33 (1930).
26 General Outdoor Adv'g Co. v. Board of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E.
799 (1935).
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nances forbidding advertising displays with due recognition to aes-
thetic considerations.
It would appear that if zoning for aesthetic reasons alone is to be
upheld, such zoning in connection with freeways, as we know them
in California, should have an excellent chance of being upheld. Free-
ways pass through the more congested areas, enormous sums of
money are spent on them, they are a source of local pride and they
provide major approaches to our metropolitan centers. The aesthetic
impact is apparent.27
Thus the California courts have the opportunity to squarely face
the long neglected but increasingly vital issue of whether aesthetic
conditions are sufficient justification for a zoning regulation. The
courts' recognition of the issue and its raniifications is extremely im-
portant because, as was earlier pointed out, the courts may with super-
ficial justification retreat into the judicial clich6 of promotion of safety;
and thus circumvent the prime policy question of aesthetics,
Conclusion
It seems then there is a definite trend toward recognizing ordi-
nances purely for the aesthetic considerations. However, in order to
accomplish this objective it is apparent that the courts are going to
have to abandon the subjective view and adopt the. more practical
view of placing the legislative considerations in, passing an ordinance
on the weighted level they deserve. Necessarily, this will involve a
recognition of the legislation as almost inviolate, but with the system
with which zoning is endowed, i.e., political answerability, it would
seem that acts of abuse or indiscretion would be held to a minimum.
Writers on the subject have expressed views favoring use of aes-
thetic zoning ordinances; California's attorney general has hinted his
favor and the practical value of property demands them. Therefore,
the only obstacle remaining is the court and the restraints placed there-
on by the courts themselves rather than by any constitutional right of
property owners.
"It is conceded that police power is adequate to restrain offensive
noises and odors. A similar protection to the eye should also be af-
forded."28
2 21 CAL. Ops. ATr'y GEN. 43 (1953).2 8 Ft.EuND, PoLicE PowE 182 (1904).
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